The Record
American Balao-class submarine, on a Cold War training exercise off Pearl Harbor. Made an inadvertent broach during an emergency surface and was rammed amidships by the destroyer escort USS Silverstein at 18:16 on 28 May 1958. All 82 crew taken off before she sank six hours later. No casualties, a near-miss in the long post-war record of submarine training losses.
The Vessel
USS Stickleback (SS-415) was an American Tench-class submarine of the United States Navy, built at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard at Vallejo, California between 1944 and 1945 and commissioned on 29 March 1945. She was 95 metres long, 1,570 tons surfaced displacement (2,415 tons submerged), and armed with ten 21-inch torpedo tubes plus one 5-inch deck gun. The Tench-class was the final development of the American Balao-class fleet submarine design that had dominated the Pacific War.
Her wartime service was minimal: commissioned in the final weeks of the Pacific War, she had conducted one war patrol (August 1945) before the Japanese surrender on 2 September 1945. Her subsequent postwar service through 1952 was as a Pacific Fleet training and experimental submarine.
She had been selected in 1952 for GUPPY conversion (Greater Underwater Propulsion Power Program), the US Navy's modernisation programme for Second World War-era submarines. The GUPPY conversion involved substantial modification of the ship's hull form, propulsion systems, and accommodation: streamlined hull lines, increased battery capacity, improved air-conditioning, and enhanced sonar equipment. The GUPPY-III conversion that Stickleback received was the most comprehensive version of the programme.
By May 1958, Stickleback had been a GUPPY-III submarine since her 1953 conversion. Her operational role in the late-1950s US Navy was as a front-line Pacific Fleet submarine: fleet exercises, anti-submarine warfare training for surface escorts, and operational patrols in the western Pacific and Aleutian areas.
Her master on her final voyage was Lieutenant-Commander Lucius Calvert Harris, 37, a career US Navy submariner. Her complement on 28 May 1958 was 79 officers and enlisted personnel.
The Voyage
On 28 May 1958, Stickleback was participating in anti-submarine warfare training exercises off Oahu, Hawaii. The specific exercise was "Operation Pinwheel", a training exercise conducted jointly with US Navy surface escorts to practice anti-submarine detection and engagement procedures. The exercise involved Stickleback as the practice target submarine; the destroyer escort USS Silverstein (DE-534) as the surface escort; and additional supporting vessels.
The exercise was conducted approximately 80 kilometres south of Oahu, in water depths of approximately 3,800 metres. The specific operational plan involved Stickleback conducting dive-and-approach manoeuvres against Silverstein; Silverstein was to detect Stickleback using her sonar systems and to execute simulated attack runs against the submarine. The exercise was conducted at periscope depth (Stickleback) and at approximately 15 knots (Silverstein).
At approximately 18:00 on 28 May 1958, Stickleback had completed one simulated attack run and was positioning for a second approach. Lieutenant-Commander Harris ordered Stickleback to dive from periscope depth to approximately 25 metres for the second approach; standard evasion procedure for the exercise.
The specific mechanical failure occurred during the dive. Stickleback's forward-diving ballast tank venting system malfunctioned: the specific valves that should have controlled the rate of dive opened excessively, causing the submarine to dive faster and steeper than the planned dive profile. The submarine's bow angle exceeded 30 degrees downward within approximately 30 seconds of the dive command.
Harris's response was standard: emergency blow of ballast tanks, reverse main engines, and attempt to level the submarine. The ballast-tank emergency blow was partially effective; the submarine's steep dive was arrested at approximately 60 metres depth. However, her forward diving trim was now substantially heavy; her trim control was difficult; her speed was progressively decreasing.
The critical failure was the submarine's inability to regain positive buoyancy and trim. By approximately 18:15 on 28 May 1958, Stickleback was approximately 60 metres below the surface, with substantial down-angle trim, and progressively losing forward momentum. Her speed dropped below 2 knots; her trim control became increasingly problematic.
The Disaster
At approximately 18:25 on 28 May 1958, with Stickleback substantially below the surface and drifting with residual speed, the submarine unexpectedly broke the surface directly in front of the approaching USS Silverstein. The sudden emergency-surface was a consequence of Stickleback's residual ballast-tank emergency blow combined with her drift speed; the submarine had become positively buoyant and had risen to the surface under her remaining momentum.
Silverstein was approaching Stickleback's presumed position (based on sonar tracking) at approximately 15 knots, conducting a simulated attack run. The specific bearing of the approach was directly at Stickleback's surfaced position; the relative speed of closure was approximately 20-25 kilometres per hour.
The specific collision occurred at approximately 18:27 on 28 May 1958. USS Silverstein's bow struck USS Stickleback's port side amidships at approximately 3-4 knots relative impact speed. The collision was severe: Silverstein's bow penetrated approximately 1 metre into Stickleback's hull; the damage opened a breach approximately 1.5 metres wide in the submarine's pressure hull; sea water began entering the submarine immediately.
Harris's immediate response was to order emergency evacuation of the submarine. The collision had damaged the submarine's systems sufficiently that continued underwater operation was impossible; the specific breach was in the submarine's pressure hull and was progressively flooding her forward compartments.
The specific evacuation was conducted rapidly. Over the next 15 minutes, the entire 79-person complement was evacuated from Stickleback via the damaged forward hatch onto Silverstein and a subsequently arriving rescue vessel. The specific successful evacuation was a substantial achievement of the combined US Navy rescue operation; the specific training exercise's protective protocols (proximity of surface rescue vessels) had made rapid evacuation possible.
USS Stickleback sank at approximately 19:05 on 28 May 1958 in approximately 3,800 metres of water approximately 80 kilometres south of Oahu. The sinking was approximately 38 minutes after the collision.
Of the 79 aboard, all 79 survived. No lives were lost in the specific Stickleback collision - a result that reflected the successful emergency evacuation and the specific protection of the training-exercise environment.
The Legacy
The USS Stickleback sinking on 28 May 1958 was a specific peacetime operational loss of an American submarine. The absence of casualties (the only no-casualty loss of a US Navy submarine in history) contrasted sharply with the substantially larger casualty figures of subsequent US submarine losses (USS Thresher in 1963, USS Scorpion in 1968).
The subsequent US Naval Board of Inquiry, conducted through summer 1958, identified the specific causes: (i) the mechanical failure of the forward-diving ballast tank venting system; (ii) the cascade of control-system failures during the subsequent emergency recovery; (iii) the specific positioning of Stickleback in a high-risk position (directly in front of Silverstein's approach); and (iv) the limited operational coordination between the submarine and the surface escort during the specific exercise.
The specific institutional response included: (i) enhanced inspection of ballast-tank venting systems on all US Navy submarines; (ii) improved exercise-coordination procedures between submarines and surface escorts during anti-submarine warfare exercises; (iii) improved training for emergency surfacing procedures; and (iv) enhanced safety-zone separations during anti-submarine warfare training.
The specific cultural memory of the Stickleback loss has been limited, primarily because of the absence of casualties. The event was the subject of internal US Navy training reviews but did not produce substantial public-memorial response. The subsequent US Navy submarine operations incorporated the Stickleback case as a specific training reference for the hazards of anti-submarine warfare exercises; the specific scenarios involving unexpected submarine surfacing in proximity to surface escorts became a standard training reference.
The specific operational continuity was also limited. Silverstein (the colliding destroyer escort) was repaired and continued in US Navy service through 1966. The specific Stickleback hull was not raised; the 3,800-metre depth made recovery operations economically impractical.
The wreck of USS Stickleback lies at approximately 3,800 metres depth south of Oahu. The wreck has been located by US Navy deep-ocean surveys but has not been systematically documented or visited. The wreck is protected under the US Sunken Military Craft Act. The wreck is not commemorated by specific memorials; the absence of casualties meant that no specific memorial effort was organised. The Stickleback case is specifically commemorated in US Navy submarine training materials as an example of the hazards of GUPPY-III submarine emergency recovery procedures.