SS Cedarville

The Vessel

The SS Cedarville was an American steel-hulled Great Lakes bulk carrier, built at the American Ship Building Company yard at Lorain, Ohio in 1927. She was 180 metres long, 8,575 gross tons, and powered by a triple-expansion steam engine of approximately 1,800 horsepower. She had been built for the U.S. Steel Corporation's Great Lakes iron-ore and limestone trade: a specialised carrier designed for the narrow locks and confined waters of the Great Lakes system.

She was originally built as the SS A. F. Harvey; she was renamed Cedarville in 1957 after purchase by U.S. Steel's Pittsburgh Steamship Division. Her operational employment through the late 1950s and early 1960s was the standard Great Lakes bulk-carrier circuit: iron ore from the Minnesota iron range to the Ohio and Pennsylvania steel mills, and limestone from the Michigan quarries to the Great Lakes steel-producing regions.

By May 1965, Cedarville was 38 years old and substantially representative of the older Great Lakes bulk-carrier fleet. Her operational history had been extensive but unremarkable: routine commercial service, with minor incidents related to ice conditions and weather delays but no significant safety events.

Her master on her final voyage was Captain Martin Joppich, 55, a career Great Lakes master with approximately 35 years of Great Lakes navigation experience. Her complement on 7 May 1965 was 35 officers and crew - a standard Great Lakes bulk-carrier complement.

The Voyage

On 7 May 1965, Cedarville was completing a standard cargo voyage: she had loaded approximately 14,500 tonnes of limestone at Rogers City, Michigan on the Lake Huron shore, and was bound for Gary, Indiana on Lake Michigan, for discharge at the U.S. Steel Gary Works. Her planned route was through the Straits of Mackinac (the narrow waterway connecting Lake Huron and Lake Michigan) and thence southwest to Gary.

The weather on the morning of 7 May 1965 was substantially foggy. Visibility in the Straits of Mackinac was reported at approximately 150 metres at various points; the specific fog conditions were typical of the late-spring Great Lakes, produced by the temperature differential between the Lake Huron surface waters (approximately 8 degrees Celsius) and the warmer air temperatures of approaching summer conditions.

At approximately 09:30 on 7 May 1965, Cedarville was transiting the Straits of Mackinac on her specified westerly course at approximately 11 knots. Her position was approximately 5 kilometres west of the Mackinac Bridge, in the narrow shipping channel that connects Lake Huron and Lake Michigan through the Straits.

Simultaneously, the Norwegian motor ship Topdalsfjord, a 139-metre general cargo vessel, was transiting the Straits on an easterly course at approximately 13 knots. The Topdalsfjord was bound from Lake Michigan to a destination on the Atlantic coast; her course was approximately opposite to Cedarville's.

The critical operational environment was the combination of: (i) heavy fog reducing visibility to approximately 150 metres; (ii) the narrow shipping channel (approximately 800 metres wide at the Straits' narrowest point); (iii) the substantial closing speed of the two ships (approximately 24 knots combined); and (iv) the limitations of 1965-era radar equipment in detecting and tracking closely-passing vessels in confined waters.

The Disaster

At approximately 09:50 on 7 May 1965, Topdalsfjord emerged from the fog approximately 400 metres ahead of Cedarville. The specific relative bearing was approximately 20 degrees off Cedarville's port bow; the closing rate was approximately 25 kilometres per hour.

Captain Joppich's response was immediate: engine reverse and hard port rudder. Cedarville began to swing to port under her rudder orders; however, her specific momentum (14,500 tonnes of cargo plus 8,575 tonnes of ship = approximately 23,000 tonnes displacement) could not be arrested in the available 400 metres.

Captain Rasmussen of Topdalsfjord similarly ordered emergency rudder and engine orders; however, the two ships' closing rate was beyond either ship's avoidance capability.

At approximately 09:52 on 7 May 1965, Topdalsfjord struck Cedarville on her port bow at approximately 8 knots relative impact speed. The specific impact penetrated Cedarville's hull approximately 3 metres deep; the breach was approximately 5 metres wide; the impact was at the waterline, directly into Cedarville's forward cargo hold.

Cedarville's forward cargo hold began flooding immediately. The specific flooding rate was approximately 60 tonnes per minute; the ship's pumps could not address this rate. Captain Joppich's specific operational decision was to attempt to beach Cedarville on the nearby Michigan shoreline before she could sink in the deep waters of the Straits.

Cedarville's speed was reduced to approximately 5 knots; her course was altered to approximately 315 degrees (north-northwest) to beach her on the nearby Michigan shore. The specific beaching attempt required approximately 15 minutes of progressive travel toward the shore. However, the flooding was progressing faster than the ship's forward progress; by approximately 10:15 on 7 May 1965, the ship's list exceeded 15 degrees to starboard; by approximately 10:20, the list exceeded 25 degrees.

SS Cedarville capsized and sank at approximately 10:25 on 7 May 1965 in approximately 30 metres of water in the Straits of Mackinac, approximately 2 kilometres south of the Michigan shore. The ship was substantially short of the beaching attempt; she sank before reaching shallow water.

The specific rescue response was rapid. The Canadian Coast Guard cutter Mackinaw and multiple US Coast Guard vessels responded to the collision; the specific rescue was further supported by the Topdalsfjord (which had been minimally damaged in the collision and was able to provide rescue support).

Of the 35 crew aboard, 10 died: predominantly crew members trapped below decks in the capsize. 25 survived: rescued from the water and from the capsized superstructure by the US Coast Guard rescue vessels. Captain Joppich survived.

The Legacy

The SS Cedarville sinking on 7 May 1965 was a significant Great Lakes peacetime disaster, though the relatively small casualty figure of 10 dead was not among the larger Great Lakes disasters of the twentieth century. The specific significance was not the casualty scale but the specific operational failures that had produced the collision.

The subsequent US Coast Guard investigation, conducted through summer 1965 under Captain Paul Trimble, identified a systematic pattern of failures: (i) the inadequate coordination between Cedarville and Topdalsfjord in the restricted fog conditions; (ii) the specific limitations of 1965-era radar equipment in tracking closely-passing vessels; (iii) the inadequate speed reduction by both vessels in the restricted-visibility conditions; (iv) the specific channel-control protocols that had not prevented opposing traffic in the fog-limited conditions; and (v) the inadequate communication between the two vessels during the approach.

The specific regulatory response was the comprehensive revision of Great Lakes navigation protocols through 1966 and 1967. The new protocols required: mandatory VHF radio communication between vessels in restricted-visibility conditions; enhanced radar-tracking procedures; specific speed-reduction requirements in fog conditions; and enhanced channel-control protocols for the Straits of Mackinac and other restricted Great Lakes waterways.

The subsequent Great Lakes navigation practice incorporated substantially enhanced fog-operation protocols. The specific operational standards for Great Lakes commercial navigation were brought substantially into alignment with the subsequent 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), which incorporated specific requirements for fog-operation communication and speed control.

The specific cultural memory of the Cedarville disaster has been substantial in the Michigan Great Lakes community. The specific memorials include the Cedarville Memorial at Rogers City, Michigan (dedicated 1966, commemorating the 10 dead); and the Cedarville Memorial Plaque at the Great Lakes Shipwreck Museum at Whitefish Point, Michigan. The 10 dead are specifically commemorated in the annual Great Lakes Memorial Service conducted at Whitefish Point on the second Saturday of November.

The subsequent specific impact on the Great Lakes limestone trade was limited: the trade continued through the subsequent decades, with enhanced safety protocols and more modern vessels. The Cedarville's sister-ships and similar vintage vessels progressively retired from service through the 1970s and 1980s, replaced by more modern Great Lakes bulk carriers.

The wreck of SS Cedarville lies at approximately 30 metres depth in the Straits of Mackinac, approximately 2 kilometres south of the Michigan shore. The wreck is a popular recreational diving site; the site is protected under Michigan state cultural heritage legislation as a designated underwater preserve. The wreck has been systematically documented by multiple recreational-diving and archaeological expeditions through the 1970s and 1980s. The 10 dead are commemorated by the Cedarville Memorial at Rogers City, Michigan, and by the Great Lakes Shipwreck Memorial at Whitefish Point.